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On the (Im)Practicality of Adversarial Perturbation for Image
Privacy
Abstract: Image hosting platforms are a popular way
to store and share images with family members and
friends. However, such platforms typically have full access to images raising privacy concerns. These concerns
are further exacerbated with the advent of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) that can be trained on
available images to automatically detect and recognize
faces with high accuracy.
Recently, adversarial perturbations have been proposed
as a potential defense against automated recognition
and classification of images by CNNs. In this paper,
we explore the practicality of adversarial perturbationbased approaches as a privacy defense against automated face recognition. Specifically, we first identify practical requirements for such approaches and
then propose two practical adversarial perturbation approaches – (i) learned universal ensemble perturbations
(UEP), and (ii) k-randomized transparent image overlays (k-RTIO) that are semantic adversarial perturbations. We demonstrate how users can generate effective
transferable perturbations under realistic assumptions
with less effort.
We evaluate the proposed methods against state-of-theart online and offline face recognition models, Clarifai.com and DeepFace, respectively. Our findings show
that UEP and k-RTIO respectively achieve more than
85% and 90% success against face recognition models.
Additionally, we explore potential countermeasures that
classifiers can use to thwart the proposed defenses. Particularly, we demonstrate one effective countermeasure
against UEP.
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Fig. 1. From left to right: original image, UEP perturbed image,
and k-RTIO perturbed image.

1 Introduction
Integration of high-resolution cameras into ubiquitous
handheld devices (e.g., mobiles, tablets) has made it
easy to capture everyday moments in digital photos.
Combined with the availability of fast mobile networks
many of the captured digital images and videos are
shared over the network or transmitted to third-party
storage providers. It has been reported that users of
social networks share more than 1.8 billion new photos
each day [2]. While cloud-based photo storage and sharing platforms provide virtually unlimited storage space
for saving and sharing images and are highly reliable
and available, such services also raise privacy concerns.
Although most social networks and photo storage and
sharing platforms now provide privacy settings to limit
public accessibility of images, they are often complicated and insufficient [54, 65]. Furthermore, those platforms have direct access to users’ images and it is not
inconceivable for such service providers to exploit the
users’ image data for their own benefit [62, 68].
The advent of scalable Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) for automated face detection and recognition [35, 38, 45, 70, 77] exacerbates this concern. While
such tools provide benign and beneficial service to users,
they nevertheless pose a significant privacy threat. For
example, Shoshitaishvili et al. [65] recently proposed
a method for tracking relationships among people by
analyzing pictures shared on social platforms using
face recognition and detection CNNs. Recently, a facerecognition based image search application, Clearview
AI app [26], has emerged that can take a given picture
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of a person and search a database of more than 3 billion
images scraped from Facebook, YouTube and millions
of other websites and provide matching images along
with links to websites containing those photos. News
of the use of this application by law enforcement agencies has raised concerns about severe erosion of privacy.
Emergence of such applications combined with the ineffective privacy settings of social networks, necessitates
the development of practical tools that allow end users
to protect their privacy against automated classifiers. In
this paper, we primarily focus on thwarting automated
face recognition.
Adversarial image perturbation has been recently
proposed as a way to protect against automated face
recognition by fooling CNNs into misclassifying the image [20, 31, 63]. Adversarial perturbations [22, 23] have
the nice property that the perturbed images are perceptually indistinguishable from the original image but are
misclassified by a CNN. Thus adversarial perturbation
provides a nice balance of privacy against automated
classifiers without degrading the usability of the images
for end users. However, these methods are not always
practical for real-world use due to the unrealistic assumption of full knowledge about the adversaries’ CNNs
(i.e., white-box model).
While black-box approaches for adversarial perturbations do exist (e.g., [42, 48, 56]), they either assume
that end users have access to large datasets (e.g., millions of images) and can train large local CNNs (e.g.,
with thousands of classes), or that they can query the
target CNN making them unrealistic as well. Semantic adversarial perturbations [28, 29] are a newer class
of adversarial perturbations that can target unknown
CNNs. They do not require any learning and are therefore computationally very efficient. However, they are
not reversible making them unsuited for image storage
applications.
Contributions: We explore the practicality of adversarial perturbations to thwart automated image classification by CNNs, and make the following contributions:
1. We identify key requirements for practical adversarial perturbation based image privacy against automated face recognition.
2. We propose two novel schemes for adversarial perturbation of images that do not require special
knowledge of the target CNNs (i.e., black-box adversarial methods) and that satisfy the identified
requirements.
(a) Our learning-based Universal Ensemble Perturbation (UEP) approach (2nd image in Figure 1) learns a single transferable adversarial
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perturbation that can be applied to multiple images. Compared to previous adversarial perturbation learning techniques, our UEP approach
requires fewer and smaller local CNNs trained
over smaller (by an order of magnitude) training
sets.
(b) Our k-Randomized Transparent Image Overlays
(k-RTIO) is a novel semantic adversarial perturbation [28] approach that generates many
unique image perturbations (3rd image in Figure 1) using only a small number of overlay
source images and a secret key, and without requiring users to train their own CNNs. In contrast to previous semantic adversarial perturbation approaches, k-RTIO perturbations are reversible.
3. We evaluate the effectiveness of both methods against highly accurate celebrity recognition
and face detection models from clarifai.com,
Google Vision API, and DeepFace [57], two stateof-the-art online classifiers and one offline classifier, respectively. Our results show that while UEP
and k-RTIO are effective at thwarting automated
face recognition, k-RTIO is computationally much
cheaper than UEP.
4. We discuss potential counter measures against our
schemes and demonstrate one effective countermeasure against UEP.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We discuss related work in Section 2. In Section 3, we present
the system model and requirements for a practical privacy mechanism based on adversarial perturbations. We
present some preliminaries on adversarial examples and
transferable adversarial methods in Section 4. We introduce our two proposed approaches in Section 5 and
evaluate them in Section 6. In Section 7, we discuss our
findings and some future directions. Finally, we conclude
in Section 8.

2 Related Work
Many cryptographic and non-cryptographic techniques
for protecting image privacy have been proposed. Here
we primarily focus on works most relevant to the problem of thwarting recognition by automated classifiers
while allowing recognition by humans.
Adversarial Perturbations: The problem of thwarting recognition by automated classifiers while allowing
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recognition by humans has recently received attention in
the research community [20, 31, 44, 63, 74]. Adversarial perturbation based approaches [20, 31, 63] among
them are most closely related to this paper. While
those approaches can fool CNNs and preserve images’
recognizability by humans they have some limitations.
Oh et al. [31] assume that end users have full knowledge about and access to target CNNs (i.e., white-box
model). Other works [20, 63], while they use a blackbox model, assume users are able to train large CNNs
to learn perturbations. However, in real-world settings,
users typically do not have access to the target CNNs
or other automated tools used by adversaries or online service providers to analyze images. Moreover, all
those approaches learn a perturbation for each image
making it expensive to protect a large set of images.
Fawkes [63] aims to perturb images to prevent target
CNNs from learning a model on them and can be complementary to our effort. Semantic adversarial perturbations [28, 29] that can fool unknown CNNs without
requiring any learning have been recently proposed. As
they do not require any learning, they are computationally very efficient. However, they are not reversible
making them ill-suited for image storage applications.
In contrast, we aim to propose practical methods for
generating reversible transferable perturbations that do
not need high computation or storage resources.
Image Encryption: Encryption techniques specifically
designed for protecting image privacy have also been
proposed (e.g., [58, 76]). These techniques obfuscate
the entire image and as a consequence images are rendered unrecognizable even by their owners making them
unable to distinguish between images without first decrypting them. Further, it has been shown that P3 [58]
is vulnerable to automated face recognition [46].
To address the problem of searching through encrypted images, Pixek App [1] uses image encryption
with embedded searchable tags. However, such schemes
require modifications at the service providers (this is the
same for encrypted file system [21, 33] based solutions
as well) and need additional effort on part of end users
to tag and browse images using tags. In contrast, our focus is on techniques that are not only reversible but also
allow end users to manage their image repositories naturally (i.e., visually rather than using keywords/tags).
Thumbnail
Preserving
Encryption
(TPE)
schemes [44, 74, 78] have been proposed to preserve
privacy of images while allowing image owners to distinguish between ciphertexts of different images naturally
(i.e., visually) without having to decrypt them. They
achieve this by ensuring that the ciphertext is itself

87

an image with the same thumbnail as the original image. Depending on the size of the thumbnail preserved,
TPE schemes are capable of thwarting recognition by
CNNs [44, 74] while still allowing image owners to distinguish between encrypted images. Their goal was to
thwart recognition by any end user other than those
who are already familiar with the image, and hence
preserve thumbnails with very low resolution. In contrast, our work aims to thwart only classifiers and not
humans.
Irreversible Obfuscations: An early approach to
thwarting facial recognition software while preserving
facial details was face deidentification (e.g., [16, 24, 25,
32, 50, 71]) that was proposed to provide privacy guarantees when sharing deanonymized video surveillance
data. In this approach instead of obfuscating the image or parts of it, faces in the image are modified to
thwart automated face recognition algorithms. These
approaches extend the k-anonymity [72] privacy notion
to propose the k-same family of privacy notions for images. At a high-level, to provide k-same protection for
a face in an image it is replaced with a different face
that is constructed as an average of k faces that are the
closest to the original face. These approaches have the
benefit of providing mathematically well-defined protection against face recognition algorithms. However, these
approaches have the downside that these modify the
original image and the transformation is typically not
reversible. Further, the perturbed image is typically not
correctly recognizable by humans. A slightly different
but related approach is where a face that needs privacy protection in an image is replaced with a similar
one from a database of 2D or 3D faces (e.g., [8, 41]).
AnonymousNet [40] is recent de-identification approach
using generative adversarial networks (GANs). These
approaches are also irreversible. In contrast, we aim to
create reversible perturbations where the perturbed images are recognizable by humans.
Approaches like blurring, pixelation, or redaction
have long been used for protecting privacy in images and
text (e.g., [37, 81]). However, such techniques are not
only irreversible but have been shown to be ineffective
especially against automated recognition methods [27,
37, 46, 50, 81].
Approaches that remove people or objects from images (e.g., [7, 34, 59]) or that abstract people or objects
(e.g., [13, 75]), or that replace faces [69] also exist. However, those approaches are irreversible. Further, it has
been shown that even if redaction techniques like replacing faces with black space are used, it may be possible to
deanonymize using person recognition techniques [53].
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3 System Model and
Requirements
In this work, our focus is on practical adversarial perturbation approaches that make scalable automated image analysis by service providers more difficult. Thwarting recognition by humans is not a goal. In fact, we
aim to develop approaches that allow image recognition
by end users so they can interact with images naturally. We assume that image storage and sharing service
providers do not have access to meta-data or auxiliary
information and treat them as an honest-but-curious or
semi-honest adversary [52]. We assume that the service
provider has trained an image classification CNN either
using publicly available user images or images that the
users have already stored with the service. A user’s goal
is to perturb the images that they upload to the service to prevent automated recognition or classification
of their images. To be practical the perturbation mechanism should satisfy the following requirements.
Black-box Scheme: In practice, end users will not
have access to the CNNs used by third-party service
providers and typically will not have detailed knowledge
of the target CNNs parameters and weights. Thus, any
viable perturbation mechanism should not require any
special knowledge of the target CNN, eliminating the
use of white-box adversarial perturbation techniques.
We assume that the user does not know anything about
the structure of the target CNN, not even all the classes
that the CNN is able to classify images into (i.e., it is
a black-box), and assume that the user does not have
query access to the CNN.
Recognizability: While white-box (i.e., full knowledge
of target CNN) adversarial perturbations typically are
very small and imperceptible [23], black-box perturbations on the other hand can be significant and are typically perceptible [48]. To be viable, the perturbed images should be perceptually recognizable by end users
but not recognizable by automated classifiers. Users
should be able to browse through perturbed images naturally using the standard interface, without having to
reverse the perturbation.
Recoverability or Reversibility: For image storage
applications, end users must be able to reverse the perturbation in order to recover the original image with
minimum to no distortion, i.e., no loss of perceptual
quality. At the same time, the service provider should
not be able to remove or reduce the perturbation.
Low Computational Cost: Since end users need to
create the perturbations, learning or creating perturba-
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tions should not require excessive computational effort
or large volumes of training data. We assume that, while
an individual user may have access to their own images
and some images of other potential users of the platform (either publicly available or those of friends using
the same platform), a user does not have access to the
entire dataset used by the service provider for training
the target CNN.
Low Storage Cost: The storage requirements of the
scheme should be small and should not increase with
the number of images. Any information needed to reverse the perturbation should take up minimal storage
at the end user.
Compatibility: Since service providers have incentives to learn and profit from user data, proposed
schemes should not depend on their support and should
be compatible with existing services to ease adoption.
Hence, using embedded thumbnails, encrypted file systems (e.g., [21, 33]) and more advanced solutions such
as searchable encryption for images [1] are not practical.
Most of the popular storage services that we tested such
as Google Drive, iCloud, etc. do not support embedded
thumbnails.

4 Preliminaries
CNNs: Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have
become very popular for image classification. CNNs are
constructed by several convolutional and maxpooling
layers and one or two fully connected layers (see Figure 18 in Appendix A). At the end, there is a softmax layer which translates the output of the last layer
to probabilities. Generally, a convolutional neural network is defined by a function F (x, θ) = Y which takes
an input (x) and returns a probability vector (Y =
P
[y1 , · · · , ym ] s.t.
i yi = 1) representing the probability of the input belonging to each of the m classes.
The input is assigned to the class with maximum probability.
To learn classifiers, the loss function which represents the cost paid for inaccuracy in classification problems, is minimized. The cross entropy loss function is
one of the popular and sufficient loss functions that is
used in classification problems. For training a CNN, we
optimize the CNN’s parameters (θ) for given inputs.
Adversarial Perturbations: Adversarial generation
methods find and add a small perturbation (δ) to an
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image that will cause the target CNN to misclassify it.
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5 Proposed Approaches

min kδk2 + J(F (x, θ))
δ

s.t. argmax F (x + δ) 6= y ∗ , x + δ ∈ [0, 1]d

(1)

where δ, x, y ∗ and J(.) are the perturbation, given
input image, true label of input image, and the loss
function, respectively. Many methods have been proposed to generate a small perturbation for a known
CNN (e.g., [11, 23, 49, 73]), but they suffer from low
transferability to unknown CNNs (See Appendix A for
different types of adversarial attacks). Therefore, transferable perturbation generation methods were proposed
to address this issue and are discussed next.
Ensemble Method: Ensemble methods to create
transferable perturbations were proposed in [6, 42].
Those works learn a perturbation for a given image on
several local CNNs, instead of using only one CNN, such
that the learned perturbation fools all local CNNs. They
established that such perturbations are transferable and
can fool unknown CNNs with high success rate. In other
words, a perturbation for an image is generalized by
learning it on multiple CNNs. To show the transferability of perturbations, authors assessed their method on,
clarifai.com, a state-of-the-art online classifier.
Universal Perturbation: Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [48],
showed that it is possible to find a single (universal)
perturbation that can be applied to multiple images to
successfully fool a CNN into misclassifying all of them.
Universal perturbation is defined as a noise pattern δ
which leads a CNN misclassifying most of the input images (x’s) with probability of p (p-value) when added
to those input images. This work showed that a universal perturbation is transferable to other CNNs with
different structures but trained on the same dataset as
the original. Further, the perturbation is added directly
to images which causes significant loss during image recovery because of rounding the pixels’ value to 0 or 1 if
they are not in range of [0, 1].
While all of these approaches are black-box approaches, (i) they either need to train and learn on multiple (4 − 5) large local CNN(s) (see Summary in Section 6.1) to create a transferable perturbation(s) [6, 42,
48] or (ii) generate one perturbation per image [6, 42]
and do not meet low computation and low storage cost
requirements. Further, they add the perturbation directly to image’s pixel value leading to significant losses
during recovery.

In this section, we introduce two methods to perturb
images in order to fool any unknown CNN. The first
method is a learning-based approach called Universal
Ensemble Perturbation (UEP). The second method is
a semantic perturbation method called k-Randomized
Transparent Image Overlays (k-RTIO). We motivate
each approach and describe how we generate and apply the perturbations.

5.1 Universal Ensemble Perturbation
As discussed in Section 3, any viable perturbation approach for image privacy should be black-box as users
are unlikely to have access to or knowledge about CNNs
used by service providers. Since black-box perturbations
tend to be significant and perceptible, reversibility of
perturbations becomes important to recover the original image. Storing the perturbations used for each image so the original can be recovered will require nearly
the same order of storage as storing the original images
themselves. Therefore, in our approach we aim to generate a single perturbation that can be applied to several images to successfully fool an unknown CNN, that
is, both universal and transferable. We achieve this by
using an ensemble approach through learning on a few
local CNNs. Unlike previous work [42, 48], our approach
uses fewer and smaller CNNs, and requires significantly
smaller training datasets than the one used to train local
CNNs (see Section 6).
Perturbation Learning: We create our Universal Ensemble Perturbation (UEP) approach by building on the
ideas from the ensemble approach [42], universal perturbation approach [48], and CW perturbation optimization and addition approach [11].
UEP learns a highly transferable, universal, and reversible perturbation using an ensemble of a few small
local CNNs. Moreover, to prevent the target CNN from
reducing the impact of the perturbation by using a reduced resolution version of the image [15], we learn a
perturbation which works for different image resolutions
by training each local CNN on different resolutions of
the image. For this work, we used three small CNNs
with only 10 classes each (see Section 6). We empirically found that using fewer than three CNNs makes
learning transferable perturbations harder, while using
more than three CNNs makes learning a perturbation

Original

Perturbed

Recovered
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Fig. 2. From bottom to top: The last row shows the original
images of celebrities. The middle row represents the UEP perturbed images. The first row displays the recovered images.

computationally expensive without significant improvement in success rate.
After learning a few (in our case only 3) local CNNs
on different image resolutions, we learn a universal perturbation which can fool all the local CNNs with a given
probability of p (∈ [0, 1]). To optimize the misclassification rate, we extend the objective function introduced
in [11] for an ensemble of CNNs and a universal attack
as follows:
f (x1 , · · · , xN ) =
XX
max(max{Yl (xi )j : j 6= yi∗ } − Yl (xi )yi∗ , −κ) (2)
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UEP(Y1 (x), · · · , Ym (x), x1 , · · · , xn , p):
δ = inf
// finding the true label of each image
∀ i yi∗ = argmax(Y (xi ))
lbound = 0.001, upbound = 100000
while lbound < upbound:
c = (upbound + lbound)/2
∀ i, zi = xi
P Q
while i k σ(Yk (zi ) 6= yi∗ ) < p × N
δ 0 ← minδ kδk2 + cf (z1 , · · · , zN )
zi = 12 (tanh (arctanh (2 × (xi − 0.5)) + δ 0 )) + 0.5
if kδ 0 k2 < kδk2 :
δ ← δ0
upbound = (upbound + lbound)/2
else
lbound = (upbound + lbound)/2
return δ
Fig. 3. UEP method learns a universal perturbation δ on a few
local CNNs (Y1 , · · · , Yc ) for set of given inputs x1 , · · · , xn .

Perturbation Addition: In the universal perturbation approach [48], the perturbation vector is added directly to all images, and if the new value of pixels are not
in the range of [0, 1], then the new values are rounded to
the nearest acceptable values (0 or 1). However, rounding a pixel’s value leads to information loss during image
recovery. Therefore, we add the learned perturbation to
the arc-tangent hyperbolic value of an image instead of
adding directly to the images as in [11]:

i

l

where Yl (xi ) is the probability vector assigned by the
lth CNN to the ith input which shows the probability
of the input image belonging to each category. And yi∗
denotes the true label of xi . We aim to minimize the
perturbation amount as well as maximize the misclassification confidence (κ). The problem can be defined as
follows:
min kδk2 + cf (x1,perturbed , · · · , xN,perturbed )
δ

(3)

A large value for coefficient c causes the resulting perturbation to have a larger value (to force all CNNs to
misclassify it), while a very small value for this parameter may lead to null solution space since it tries to fool
all CNNs for all inputs with a small perturbation. We
optimize the perturbation for different coefficient c values using a binary-search (see Figure 3) and pick the
smallest perturbation that can fool p × N of total samples (N ).

1
(tanh (arctanh (2 × (xi − 0.5)) + β × δ)) + 0.5
2
(4)
where xi,pert is the perturbed version of the image
xi and δ is the learned perturbation. Here β is a weighting factor that tunes transferability versus perturbation
amount. While this does not eliminate rounding losses
completely, it significantly reduces such loss.
Further, unlike the traditional adversarial approaches, UEP perturbation can be added in with different weights to the image to control the trade-off between transferability and recognizability. While learning
UEP on local CNNs, we set β = 1 to create a powerful
perturbation. But, when applying the learned perturbation to an image, we can set β value to trade-off between
fooling success rate and recognizability (see Section 6).
The original image is recovered by reversing the process on the perturbed image. Adding the perturbation
to the arc-tangent hyperbolic value of an image, both
xi,pert =
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simplifies the objective function and alleviates information loss during image recovery [11].
Practicality of UEP: As the preceding discussion
shows, UEP is designed to be a black-box perturbation
approach that produces highly transferable and universal perturbations. It meets the reversibility and low
storage cost requirements identified in Section 3 as perturbations can be reversed by storing only the universal perturbation. While the perturbations produced by
UEP are significant and perceptible, as seen in Figure 2,
the perturbed images are still recognizable for humans
and can be recovered with very low loss by removing
perturbation. Further, since UEP uses three small local
CNNs with only 10 classes and does not require users
to have access to large datasets. UEP is also computationally more efficient compared to previous approaches
as will see in Section 6. Further, UEP does not require
any changes to the service provider and can work with
existing services.

5.2 k-Randomized Transparent Image
Overlays
While our UEP approach requires lower computational resources compared to previous learning-based
approaches, learning perturbations is still computationally expensive (see Section 6.1). Semantic perturbations [29] on the other hand do not rely on learning and
tend to be computationally cheaper. Different semantic
perturbation approaches target different weaknesses of
CNNs (e.g., coverage of training data, reliance on interpixel dependencies etc.) [28].
The main component of CNNs are kernels in the
convolutional layers. Kernels are small windows moving

Fig. 4. k-RTIO Scheme. ID of main image is used to select k
overlay images from the set S and then ID of selected images
are used to generate a permutation. Both overlay selection and
block permutation algorithm use the user’s secret key.
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Fig. 5. Left to right: original, k-RTIO perturbed and recovered
images.

over image space and measuring dependencies among
adjacent pixels to find a pattern or a feature. Transparent image overlay-based approach tends to decrease
the pixel dependencies and makes features invisible to
CNN kernels. Here we build on this transparent overlays
based approach that was originally proposed for fooling
Google Video API [29]. When translated to images, this
approach adds a weighted overlay image to the original
image as follows:
Ipert = α × Iorg + (1 − α) × Iovl

(5)

where α is mixing parameter, and Ipert , Iorg and Iovl
are perturbed, original, and overlay images.
Despite the high transferability (success in fooling
unknown CNNs) especially at low values of α, direct
application of this technique has the following drawback. If the same overlay image is used for perturbing
multiple original images then the original images can
potentially be recovered through a well known signal
processing technique called Blind Signal Separation [10]
(see Figure 21 in Appendix D). If a different overlay image is used for each original image, then all those overlay
images need to be stored locally to be able to recover the
original images defeating the purpose of cloud-storage
and violating our low storage requirement. Further, we
need to make sure that perturbed image is recognizable
by end users. To overcome this problem, we propose
k-Randomized Transparent Image Overlays which generates a unique overlay for every image using only a
small set of initial overlay images, a secret seed and a
pseudorandom function.
Perturbation Generation: To generate unique overlays for each original image, we first choose a random
subset of k (typically 3 or 4) candidate overlay images
from a set S of stored initial overlay images. This set
S is relatively small (30 images) and can be stored encrypted on a cloud platform or locally. The choice of
this set does not significantly change the fooling performance of k-RTIO; we discuss selection of this set in
Section 6.2. As shown in Figure 4, to select these k images for each source image, users use their secret key
and ID of the original image (each image has a different
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ID) as inputs to a pseudorandom function. More concretely, we employ AES as the pseudorandom function.
Let key denote a 128-bit seed and let id be a unique
identifier for the given source image (e.g., a filename or
timestamp). Then the choice of the jth overlay image
(out of |S| = m possibilities) is made according to:

After selecting k random candidate images, the k chosen
images are divided into b blocks each and these blocks
are permuted using a pseudorandom permutation. The
permutation of blocks is based on the candidate overlay
image ID, source image ID, and user’s secret key. Specifically, the blocks of the jth overlay image are permuted
using the Fisher-Yates shuffling algorithm [19]. Recall
that in the ith iteration of Fisher-Yates, the algorithm
chooses a random value in the range {0, . . . , b−i}, where
b is the number of items being shuffled. This random
choice can be derived in a repeatable way (for the jth
overlay image) via:
AES(key, idk1kjki) mod b − i + 1.
As long as the ids of a user’s images are distinct,
then all inputs to AES are distinct. Use of a pseudorandom function guarantees that all its outputs are indistinguishable from random, when invoked on distinct
inputs. Using this approach, the user needs to store only
the short AES key, and the set of initial images S from
which all unique overlay images can be re-derived as
needed for recovering the original image (see Figure. 7).
The final overlay image is simply the average of
these k images with permuted blocks. Although the pool
S of base overlay images may be small, the number of
derived overlay images that result from this process is
very large. For example, for an image set of |S| = 10,
k = 4 and b = 12, the number of possible overlay images
10!
is 10!(10−4)!
× (12!)4 ≈ 7.3 × 1031 making it hard for the
target CNN to correctly guess the overlay used even if
S is known.
Perturbation Addition: As shown in Figure 4, the
generated overlay is added to the source image as follows:
(1 − α)
k

X

(b)

=1

(c)

=2

(d)

=3

(e)

=4

(f)

=5

Fig. 6. UEP recognizability vs. β that controls noise level

image using the reverse process as follows:

AES(key, idk0kj) mod m.

Ipert = α × Iorg +

(a) Original

Iorg =

Iper
(1 − α)
−
α
k×α

X

Iovli

Iovli ∈Overlays(key,id,b,S)

Practicality of k-RTIO: As the preceding discussion
shows, k-RTIO does not require knowledge of the target CNN, nor does it require support from the service
provider. Further, k-RTIO generates semantic perturbations and does not require learning using any CNNs
and is therefore computationally
cheaper than UEP (see
2
Section 6.2). Since the perturbations are efficient to generate, end users do not need to store individual perturbations for recovering original images but can re-create
them using a secret key and a small set of initial overlay
images leading to low near constant storage overhead.
The recognizability of images perturbed using k-RTIO
is a function of α, b and k. In Section 6.2 we will explore values of these parameters such that k-RTIO can
thwart recognition by automated classifiers while providing reasonable recognizability for humans.

6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the success rate of the two
proposed methods against two state-of-the-art online
image classifiers (www.clarifai.com and Google Vision
API) and a state-of-the-art offline recognition and detection model DeepFace [57]. We then discuss the computational costs of each approach. Finally, we explore
different filtering techniques that classifiers could potentially use as countermeasures against the proposed
perturbations.

6.1 UEP Performance

Iovli

Iovli ∈Overlays(key,id,b,S)

where Overlays(key, id, b, S) is a function that takes secret key, image id, number of blocks and overlays set
S and returns k overlays images with permuted blocks.
The perturbation can be removed to recover the original

UEP Simulation Setup: UEP requires training a
few small local CNNs. We trained 3 small CNNs, two
VGG-16 [66] and one Facescrub CNN [46] using random initialization points. VGG-16 has 5 convolutional
layers and 2 fully connected layers (see Figure 18) and
FaceScrub CNN has 3 convolutional layers and 2 fully
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Overlays(key, id, b, S):
K=∅
for j = 1 to k:
// randomly choose k overlay candidates
v = AES(key, idk0kj) mod |S|
IMG = vth element of S
remove vth element from S
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rameter (see Equation 3), which controls the perturbation amount, we used binary search in the range of
[0.001, 100000] and set p = 0.7.

// keyed Fisher-Yates shuffle on blocks
for i = 1 to b:
t = AES(key, idk1kjki) mod b − i + 1
swap blocks b − i and t in IMG
add IMG to K
return K
Fig. 7. Pseudorandom method for creating overlay images with
permuted blocks for an image with identifier id. # of blocks per
overlay image is b. Set of candidate overlay images is S.

connected layers (more details of the CNNs are in Appendix C). Recall that, to prevent the target CNN from
reducing the impact of the perturbation by using a lower
resolution version of the image [15], we train each local
CNN on different image resolutions and learn a perturbation over them. To implement a resolution reduction
or a thumbnail function, we used an additional convo1
lutional layer size of 2 × 2 with values of 2×2
= 0.25 to
resize input images before rendering them to CNNs. For
example, by setting up the stride value to 2 × 2 we can
have a thumbnail function that reduces the size of the
1
image to 2×2
= 0.25 of original size (see Figure 19 in
Appendix A).
We used the FaceScrub [51] dataset, an image
dataset of 530 celebrities (classes) and ≈ 100K images
for our evaluations. We selected 10 classes, uniformly
at random, from among 230 classes of FaceScrub that
have at least 150 images in the training dataset. The
use of only 10 classes for training local CNNs is keeping
inline with our assumption of limited end user access
to data and computational capacity. To detect celebrity
faces and crop them, we used DeepFace face detector
CNN [57]. For each of the 10 celebrities (classes), we
randomly selected 150 − 200 images from the training
dataset and learned three local CNNs, two at 224 × 224
pixel resolution and one at 112×122 pixel resolution. We
then chose 200 (N ) images in total over these 10 celebrities (classes) from the training dataset and learned a
universal ensemble (UEP) perturbation over these images across the three local CNNs that we trained. As
shown in Figure 3, to find the best value for c pa-

Fig. 8. UEP performance on Google Vision API face detection
model, and DeepFace face detector and recognition models.

UEP Effectiveness: We evaluate UEP against
Google Vision API’s face detection model, and face detection and recognition models of clarifai.com and
DeepFace [57]. To this end, we selected more than 1000
FaceScrub images in total from all the 530 classes (not
just the 10 classes on which local CNNs were trained).
Then we cropped (Note: all adversarial perturbation
methods learn on a specific image size that depends on
the CNNs’ input size.) faces with DeepFace face detector model [51] and then applied UEP generated perturbation. Moreover, we can control the transferability of
UEP perturbation by using different weighting (β) parameter (see equation 4). We evaluate our method for
different values of β parameter.
UEP vs. Google Vision API: Google Vision API was
able to detect 98.8% of faces in cropped benign images.
As shown in Figure 8 (dashed blue line), for a small
value of β, UEP perturbation exhibited low transferability (i.e., success rate) against Google Vision API.
However, for larger β values, Google Vision API’s face
detection rate decreases significantly (≤ 30% at β = 5).
While larger β values can fool face detection models,
they also decrease recognizability for humans. Figure 6
shows the recognizability of the images for different values of β. Thus, there is a trade-off between fooling success rate and human recognizability. Note that, this is
a face detection model and not a recognition model.
UEP vs. Clarifai.com: Clarifai.com’s face detection
could detect more than 99% of faces and recognize
87.25% faces of unmodified images. Clarifai.com was
able to detect 98% of perturbed faces with UEP per-
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Fig. 9. Different α values vs. size of block for k = 3 overlay images. Overlay images were chosen randomly but the same overlay
images were used in all cases.

k

Recoverability/Reversibility: UEP does not add the perturbation
directly to pixels but adds it in the arc8
tangent hyperbolic space (see equation 4). When mapping back to the pixel space (integers values in [0, 255]),
6 need to round the pixel’s value. However, this
we may
loss is not perceptually recognizable as measured by the
structural similarity index (SSIM) [82] between the orig4
inal and
recovered images. SSIM is a popular measure
used to compare perceptual image similarity. For two
identical images SSIM value will be 1. Our results show
2

4

8

16
Block Size

32

64

8

6

k

turbation even with β = 5. However, its face recognition was able to recognize fewer than 6% of faces for
β = 3 (green dash-and-dot line in Figure 8). In other
words, face recognition model is more sensitive to perturbations. While small values of β are not good enough
to thwart recognition by unknown CNNs, with β = 2,
face recognition model of clarifai.com was able to recognize only 37% of faces and this comes down to less than
6% for β = 3. As seen in Figure 6, perturbed faces still
remain recognizable for β = 3.
UEP vs. DeepFace Models: We also evaluated UEP
against DeepFace face detection and recognition models. We sampled more than 1000 images of celebrities
from FaceScrub dataset that are known to DeepFace
face recognition model (about 186 classes). This model
was able to detect all faces in unperturbed images and
recognize 97.28% of them. We then tested DeepFace
with perturbed images with different levels of perturbation (β values). As shown in Figure 8, the face detection and face recognition models have low accuracy,
less than 20% (for both detection and recognition) for
larger values of β(≥ 3).

4

2

4

8

16
Block Size

32

64

Fig. 10. Different number of overlay images vs. different number
of block sizes for α = 0.6. Used same overlay images per row.

that the average SSIM measured over the 1000 original
and recovered images is 0.99 (SD = 0.0038). A distribution of SSIM values for UEP recovered images is shown
in Figure 13.
UEP Computational Cost: Our universal transferable 1perturbation is learned using only 200 randomly
selected images but can be applied to any other image.
Compared to previous approaches [42, 48], our hybrid
approach requires significantly less computational effort
and time and achieves better results. But even training
small CNNs is computationally expensive operation. For
instance, training three small local CNNs and learning
a universal transferable perturbation using 200 images
took 13 hours on a standard desktop with 64GB RAM
and an Intel Xeon E5-1630v4 3.70GHz quad-core CPU,
and a GTX 1080 Ti GPU with 11GB RAM (Appendix C
has network details). Training the 3 local CNNs took
less than 1 hour and learning the universal transferable
perturbation over 200 images took about 12 hours. However, this is a one-time computation cost that can be
expended offline. The learned perturbation can be used
for perturbing multiple images and hence the learning
cost is amortized over all the images.
Since a single perturbation can be applied for a
batch of images, the cost for storing the learned perturbations in order to recover the original image is only
a small fraction of the storage required for the images.
For example, in our evaluation we created a universal
perturbation for 200 images and hence the additional
cost for local storage is one perturbation (1/200th of
total image storage).
Summary: We showed that even with access to a small
dataset, 10 classes and at most 200 images per class,
one can learn small CNNs and generate a universal per-
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Fig. 11. Google Vision API face detection model performance on kRTIO images for k=3 and k=8.

turbation with high transferability. This is in contrast
with Liu et al. [42] who train 4 large CNNs (with 1000
classes each) using a training dataset (ILSVRC [61]) of
1.2M images to achieve only 76% transferability (over
200 test images) on Clarifai.com. Similarly, MoosaviDezfooli et al. achieved only 70% fooling rate even after using 4000 images to learn a universal perturbation.
When using only 1000 images to learn a perturbation
they achieved less than 40% fooling rate (see Figure 6
in [48]). In contrast, UEP can learn an effective universal perturbation using only 200 images and achieve
≥ 94% fooling rate.
Our evaluation of UEP, on more than 1000 images
and 3 different face detection and 2 different face recognition models, shows that fooling face detection models
is harder than face recognition models. In other words,
face recognition models are more sensitive to perturbations. Also, a β = 3 showed sufficient fooling capability on face recognition models while keeping the images recognizable. Our UEP method also has less loss
compared to other transferable perturbation generation
approaches because perturbation is added in the arctangent hyperbolic space of the images instead of directly to their pixel values.

6.2 k-RTIO Performance
k-RTIO Simulation Setup: Recall that k-RTIO requires a set S of initial overlay images. We observed empirically that the choice of this set of images did not significantly alter the fooling performance of k-RTIO. However, we felt that including images with human faces
may reduce recognizability. So we chose a set of 30 random images from the Internet that did not include faces

from our initial set S (this set is shown in Figure 20 in
Appendix B). Similar to UEP evaluation, we selected
1000 images from the FaceScrub dataset uniformly at
random and applied k-RTIO perturbations that were
generated using different values for α (mixing parameter), k (number of overlay source images), and b (number
of blocks in an overlay image).
Effectiveness of k-RTIO: Similar to UEP evaluation,
to assess k-RTIO, we evaluated it against Google Vision
API’s face detection model, online face detection and
recognition models of Clarifai.com, and face detection
and recognition models of DeepFace.
k-RTIO vs. Google Vision API : Google Vision API detected faces in less than 40% of original unperturbed
images (here we did not crop the faces but rather submitted the original images). Then we perturbed those
images for which Google Vision API correctly detected
faces with k-RTIO approach. Note that unlike UEP that
needs to resize images to apply perturbation, k-RTIO
does not need to resize the main image (just overlay images should be resized to main image’s size). As shown
in Figure 11, Google Vision API only can detect faces
in less than 35% of images when k = 3 and α ≤ 0.5 for
small block sizes (less than 10). Increasing α value or
number of overlay images (k) leads face detection success rate to increase. This is because a larger α value
implies more of the original image is present in the
perturbed image and thus can increase recognizability
for both humans and automated classifiers. This can
be seen in Figure 9 where the image becomes clearer
for higher α values for every block size. Increasing the
number of overlay images used (k) leads k-RTIO perturbation to look like random noise as the different overlay
images are averaged, and therefore the perturbation be-
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comes ineffective. This is evident from Figure 10 where
for k values greater than 4 images become easy to perceptually recognize for all block sizes. Interestingly, both
Figures 9 and 10 show that smaller block sizes seem to
produce less obfuscated images for humans while still
thwarting automated classifiers.
k-RTIO vs. Clarifai.com: Clarifai.com’s face detection
model was able to detect faces in all original images
sampled from the FaceScrub dataset. Clarifai.com’s face
recognition model was able to recognize ≈ 82% of the
celebrities in these images. To evaluate the k-RTIO
performance on face recognition model, we used only
the images that were recognized by Clarifai.com’s face
recognition model. As shown in the top row of Figure 12, similar to Google Vision API, for small values of
α ≤ 0.45 and small block sizes clarifai.com’s face recognition model is able to detect faces in very few images
(< 7%) even when face detection model is able to detect
faces in more than 80% of images successfully.
k-RTIO vs. DeepFace Models: We also evaluated kRTIO against DeepFace face detection and recognition
models. As in the case of UEP, we selected more than
1000 images from FaceScrub dataset that DeepFace classified correctly. We perturbed the selected images using k-RTIO with different α values and block sizes and
tested them against DeepFace. As shown in the bottom
row of Figure 12, both models showed low performance
for k-RTIO perturbed images with a small block size
(even for larger α values).
Recoverability/Reversibility: We can always regenerate
the exact overlay image that was added to original images using the secret key. However, k-RTIO still needs
to round up the pixel values after adding overlay images
leading to some loss. However, this loss is not perceptually recognizable. To measure the perceptual similarity,
we again used SSIM to evaluate the similarity between
the original and recovered images. Our results show that
SSIM measure between original and recovered images
averaged over the 1000 tested images is 0.96 (SD=0.07).
A distribution of SSIM values k-RTIO recovered images
is shown in Figure 13. k-RTIO recovered images tend to
exhibit lower SSIM values as the perturbation is applied
to the whole image and not just the faces as is done for
UEP. For this experiment, we set the k-RTIO parameters as k = 3, block-size= 8 and α = 0.45 (a sweet spot
for fooling unknown face recognition models).
Computational Costs of k-RTIO: Unlike transferable perturbation generation, the k-RTIO method is
computationally much more efficient. While it does involve (k×b)+k AES invocations for generating a unique
overlay for each image, AES is computationally inexpen-
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sive especially with hardware instruction set support.
For example, generating a permutation for 500 blocks
takes 9 × 10−5 milliseconds and permuting an overlay
image with 625 blocks of 40 × 40 pixels each took less
5 × 10−4 milliseconds (wall-clock time) with no special
optimizations or effort. Further, creation of unique overlays can easily be parallelized when perturbing multiple
images. End users need only store the secret key (128
bits) and a small image set S used in the creation of
unique overlays to recover the original images. Thus,
storage costs remain constant irrespective of the number of images that are perturbed.
Summary: Similar to the case of UEP, we find that
fooling face detection models is harder than fooling face
recognition models. As shown in Figures 11 and 12, face
detection models can detect faces better for larger block
sizes (i.e., smaller number of blocks (b)) even at lower
α values. However, k-RTIO is able to effectively thwart
face recognition models. For small block sizes (4 × 4 or
8 × 8), face recognition models recognize 15% of faces
at best for α ≤ 0.5. For lower alpha values, say α =
0.4, face recognition rate does not go above 15% for
any block size. Thus, the mixing parameter α and the
number of blocks b are critical factors that impact face
recognition. Similarly, as shown in Figures 10 and 11,
number of overlay images used is also a critical factor
as using more overlays leads to a final perturbation that
looks like random noise and therefore ineffective.

6.3 Potential Attacks Against UEP and
k-RTIO
We explore different countermeasures that can potentially be deployed against the proposed perturbation
approaches. We show that using one perturbation for
several images provides adversaries with an opportunity
to estimate the perturbation and recover classifiable images (if not original images). This is a downside of using
a single semantic perturbation for multiple images and
led to the k-RTIO approach which uses a unique perturbation per image. We also explore a countermeasure
where the target CNNs learns on perturbed images.
Perturbation Estimation and Removal: Let us assume that the perturbation is added directly to images
(x0i = xi + δ) and an adversary wants to find δ given
only the perturbed images. Adversaries can treat δ as
the main signal and the images as noise added to the
main signal. In this case, the noise signal is not independent or zero mean (but rather images of faces). However,
target CNNs do not need to recover the exact pertur-

97

DeepFace

Clarifai.com

On the (Im)Practicality of Adversarial Perturbation for Image Privacy

Fig. 12. Clarifai.com (online) and DeepFace (offline) face recognition and detection models on k-RTIO perturbed images for k = 3.

Fig. 14. UEP perturbation estimation and removal. The first
image is the perturbed image, the second one is median of 200
perturbed images. The third image is inverted median and the
final image is the recovered image by an adversary (λ = 0.42).

Fig. 13. SSIM histogram for recovered UEP and k-RTIO images. In contrast to k-RTIO, UEP only perturbs faces in an
image, therefore it has larger SSIM on average.

bation as they do not have to recover the exact original
image. They only need to recover enough of a likeness
to the original image to be able to classify the image
correctly. To get a rough estimate of the perturbation,
a target CNNs can compute the median of pixels in all
perturbed images to approximate the δ. It can then add

the inverted median to a perturbed image as a new layer
(x = λ × x0i + (1 − λ) × inv(δ 0 )).
As shown in Figure 14, using this approach a target CNN can obtain an image close to the original and
that seems to be sufficient for recognition. We have
assessed 200 images after removing the perturbation
with median estimation method and submitted it to
the clarifai.com’s celebrity face detection model. As
shown in Figure 15, clarifai.com’s success rate for
different values of λ (0.40 to 0.56) is as high as 70% (for
λ ∈ [0.44, 0.48]) - more than tenfold improvement! In the
worst case scenario, if we assume that the target CNN
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Fig. 15. Target CNN can recover 60% of the images by using Perturbation Estimation and Removal method just with 5 images
using the same perturbation. By setting λ value to 0.48, an adversary can improves its success rate to 70%.

can know when it classified correctly then it can vary λ
for every image and reach an accuracy as high as 80.5%
with access to only 35 images modified using the same
perturbation. Thus, using a single UEP perturbation
for several images may allow target classifiers to estimate the perturbation and recover classifiable images.
As shown in the Figure 15, an automated classifier can
improve their classification accuracy to 70% by estimating perturbation using as few as 10 perturbed images.
Unlike UEP that uses a single perturbation for several images, k-RTIO generates a unique perturbation
for each image, hence this perturbation estimation and
removal approach is not effective against k-RTIO.
Robust CNNs: Many methods have been proposed to
detect and reject adversarial examples (e.g., [3, 4, 47,
67, 80]). These methods are suitable for safety sensitive
application such as disease recognition and autonomous
cars in which making wrong decision may cause huge
consequences. However, such approaches are not useful
as defenses against UEP or k-RTIO as those methods
want to detect and reject perturbed images as much as
possible which aligns with our goal of preventing automated classifiers from correct classification. Other proposed methods tend to make learning white-box attacks
harder for an adversary [5, 56]. However, such defenses
are still vulnerable to black-box attacks in which an adversary learns highly transferable perturbations on using local CNNs. Another approach is to train robust
CNNs that are able to classify adversarial images correctly [43] by re-training the network on both benign
and adversarial images. However, it has been shown that
this approach does not make CNNs robust against all
kinds of adversarial examples even for small CNNs [64].
Here we aim to assess the classification accuracy im-

provement on k-RTIO perturbed images when one trains
a CNN both on benign and k-RTIO perturbed images.
For this, we selected TinyImageNet [39] with 200
classes, 100000 training-set images, and 10000 test-set
images as the target CNN. We trained an Xception
Convolutional Neural Network [14] on this dataset. In
100 training epochs, this CNN achieved 65.42% accuracy on the test-set images. We then added 100000 and
10000 k-RTIO perturbed images to training and test respectively, and retrained the Xception CNN. We used
the same learning rate and same random seed number to initialize the CNN weights. The robust Xception
CNN achieved 68.50% accuracy on benign test-set images and 32.1% accuracy on average on k-RTIO images
(α ∈ {0.45, 0.5}, block − size ∈ {4, 8, 16, 64}).
As shown in Figure 16, learning on k-RTIO images
can improve accuracy. However, the accuracy on images
with low alpha values α = {0.4, 0.45} was still less than
29% and 39% respectively. In other words, robust CNNs
can improve their accuracy on k-RTIO perturbed images but not significantly for small α values. Note that
we used the same overlay set for perturbing images in
the training and test sets to evaluate the robust CNN.
This simulates a situation when the target CNN has
access to a user’s overlay set S.
Noise Reduction Techniques: Adversarial training
showed good performance against adversarial examples
for small CNNs, but this approach has been shown to be
computationally expensive at large scale [5] and not a
desirable solution for dealing with adversarial samples.
Approaches to recover classifiable images from perturbed ones using different filtering techniques have
been explored [15]. Note that CNNs do not need to recover original images to classify them correctly. They
only need to reduce the impact of the perturbation to
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Fig. 16. The accuracy of the CNN of TinyImageNet on perturbed images by k-RTIO images for k = 3 (left) for the original CNN
learned on benign images, and (right) robust CNN which is learned on the k-RTIO images.

obtain a correct classification. Here, we explore filtering approaches that can reduce perturbation noise sufficiently to make them recognizable for CNNs. To evaluate robustness of k-RTIO, we applied different filters
such as Blurring [60], Median Filter [30], Grayscale Filter and Gaussian Filter to reduce noise or distortion. As
shown in Figure 17, none of these methods could improve image quality for DeepFace face recognition classifier significantly.

7 Discussion and Future Work
Adversarial perturbation is being studied as a way to
address privacy concerns with scalable automated face
recognition by CNNs [20, 31, 63]. In this work, we proposed some practical requirements for such defenses and
proposed two perturbation schemes, UEP and k-RTIO,
that meet those requirements. However, these schemes
have their limitations.
Downside of Universal Perturbation: UEP generates a single transferable perturbation that can be used
on multiple image to successfully fool an unknown CNN.
The rationale for designing UEP, a universal transferable perturbation scheme, was to amortize the cost of
learning a perturbation across multiple images, and to
be able to reverse the perturbation with a low storage
cost of just storing one perturbation. However, the use
of a single perturbation across multiple images opens
up the possibility of a target CNN estimating or learning this perturbation by observing multiple perturbed
images. Indeed, as described in Section 6.3, we show
that it is possible to filter the perturbation sufficiently
enough to allow correct classification. This leads us to
observe that cost-efficient approaches to learn and store

image-specific perturbations need to be developed before learning-based perturbation approaches can become
practical defense tools against automated classification.
Alternatively, if multiple independent universal perturbations can be computed and used, it may be possible
to leverage them to thwart the perturbation estimation
approach discussed in Section 6.3. Both these remain
open problems.
Efficiency of Semantic Perturbations: In contrast
to adversarial-learning approaches such as UEP, our
semantic approach k-RTIO reduces the efficiency of a
CNN in recognizing features, by reducing the similarity of adjacent pixels. k-RTIO is as a better choice
than UEP, given that k-RTIO is both computationally
cheaper and found to be more effective. We are encouraged by the feasibility to find cheaper techniques
to thwart recognition by existing classifiers. While our
initial evaluation shows k-RTIO is robust against common filtering techniques, it is not an exhaustive list and
further work is needed in this direction.
Re-training a CNN on adversarial examples has
been shown to improve the CNN’s robustness against
such examples [43] and is a potential defense against kRTIO. Although this approach is not computationally
feasible for large scale datasets [5], we did evaluate its effectiveness against k-RTIO using TinyImagenet dataset
to train a CNN on both clean and k-RTIO perturbed
images. Our evaluation showed that for small values of
α, this robust CNN’s accuracy on perturbed images has
not improved significantly (< 30% and 40% for α = 0.4
and 0.45, respectively).
Recognizability: Our findings indicate a sweet spot
for k-RTIO parameters (k = 3, α = 0.45, and b < 20)
where classifiers have low success while the images remain visually recognizable (see Figure 9). However, it

On the (Im)Practicality of Adversarial Perturbation for Image Privacy

100

Fig. 17. Filtering results on DeepFace face detection and celebrity recognition models for α = 0.45 and k = 3.

would be good to empirically evaluate the recognizability of k-RTIO perturbed images through user studies
and to characterize the boundaries for human recognition in terms of parameter values for k, α, and b.
Lack of Strong Guarantees: Besides learning a robust CNN, online service providers may also be able
to rely on other channels of information other than the
image itself to infer information that can help them classify correctly, such as where, when, and with whom the
image was shared. Further, an adversary may be able
to use the structure present in overlay images to reduce their effort required to recreate the unique overlay image. While this can be done using visual clues
manually, it may also be feasible to automate this although we are not aware of a specific way to efficiently
achieve that. Similarly, it may be possible to find a
smoothing filter that allows an adversary to correctly
classify a k-RTIO image without reversing the perturbation. In other words, unlike traditional privacy mechanisms like encryption, perturbation-based defenses are
not yet able to provide provable guarantees. This is especially the case as it is hard to quantify the information
leaked by perturbed images (especially since we require
it to be sufficient enough for human recognition). At
least in the case of ideal TPE schemes [74] the leaked
bits can be succinctly characterized. While differentialprivacy based perturbation approaches are emerging
(e.g., [17, 18]) they are currently not reversible. Perturbation schemes that thwart one pre-specified classifier
while allowing another pre-specified classifier to classify
correctly (e.g., [31, 79]) have also been proposed. However, those approaches are also not reversible. Further,
it is not clear how they fare against an unknown classifier. This lack of defined guarantees is not specific to

just UEP or k-RTIO but seems to be true for adversarial
perturbation based defenses in general. This is an open
question that needs to be explored for image perturbation based privacy defenses to become practical.
Finally, while problems that are hard for AI and
easier for humans have been explored in the context of
distinguishing between humans and robots on the web
(e.g., CAPTCHAs), there seems to be a need to revisit
such a paradigm for privacy against automated classifiers.

8 Conclusion
Given that users tend to store and share photos with
friends and family using cloud-based platforms with
weak access control options, the emergence of scalable
and automated image classification is a serious threat
to user privacy. In this work we explored two reversible
image perturbation techniques that can thwart classification and tracking by automated classifiers while at the
same time allowing recognition by humans. We showed
that our k-Randomized Transparent Image Overlays
(k-RTIO) approach is not only very effective but also
computationally cheaper in contrast to learning-based
perturbation methods. However, more work is needed
before perturbation based approaches can truly become
practical.
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A Adversarial Attacks
Here, we introduce the well-known methods for generating adversarial examples for a given image for a known
CNNs.
Fast Gradient Sign [23]: This method aims to minimize the maximum changes in each pixel for a target
attack. More precisely, it tends to minimize L∞ . Therefore, it uses the sign of gradient of loss function as follows:
xnew = x − .sign(∇J(F (x, θ), y 0 ))
(6)
In that, y 0 is the target label and  is a constant small
coefficient which controls the maximum changes of pixels. This method is fast but not efficient. Also, in [36],
an iterative variants of FGS, called IFGS, has been proposed to increase its efficiency.

Fig. 18. VGG-16 Convolutional Neural Network [9].

L-BFGS [73]: This method is a fast method to find a
targeted or untargeted attack. This method minimizes
following equation by L-BFGS method.
min c.kδk2 + J(F (x, θ)), x + δ ∈ [0, 1]d
δ

(7)

where c is constant coefficient which leads δ has small
value if it has the large value. This parameter controls
the amount of changes in a given image.
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Fig. 19. Using a convolutional layer with stride value of (2, 2)
and kernel values of 0.25, one can implement a thumbnail function to reduce the size of an image to 25% of original size.

Deepfooling [49]: Unlike the fast gradient sign
method, this method is for untargeted attack. This
method is a fast and efficient method to find a small
perturbation for a given image. Similar to L-BFGS, it
minimizes kδk2 . This method is based on an iterative
linearization of the loss function.
Table 1. Table of Notations.
Notation
CNN
UEP
k-RTIO
White-Box
Attack
Black-Box
Attack
Universal
perturbation
Transferability
BSS
F (x, θ)

Y (x)
J (.)
δ
α
k
b
κ

β
y∗
σ(t)
p
λ
inv(δ)

Description
Convolutional Neural Network
Universal Ensemble Perturbation
k Randomized Transparent Image Overlays
Learning adversarial perturbation on known
and accessible CNNs
Learning adversarial perturbation locally for
unknown CNNs
A single perturbation which works on several
images
Ability of a perturbation to fool unknown
CNNs
Blind Signal Separation
A function representing a CNN that returns
a probability vector. x is the input image and
θ are weights of the CNN.
Probability vector returned by a CNN
P
(F (x, θ) = Y (x),
Y (x)i = 1)
i
Loss function (e.g., entropy)
Adversarial perturbation
Mixing parameter in kRTIO
Number of overlay images in k-RTIO
Number of blocks in k-RTIO
Misclassification confidence: minimum difference between confidence of the target class
and the true class.
UEP perturbation weighting factor
True label of a given input
σ(t) = 1 if t is true otherwise σ(t) = 0
Universal perturbation misclassification rate
Mixing parameter in perturbation and estimation removal
1−δ
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Carlini Attack [11]: In contrast to previous methods, this method does not use loss function to find a
perturbation. Authors of [11] introduced a new objective function based on minimum difference between the
probabilities assigned to the true class and other classes
such that the objective function has lower value if a
CNN misclassifies the image with higher confidence as
follows:
f (x) = max(max{Y (x)j : j 6= y ∗ } − Y (x)y∗ , −κ)

(8)

where Y (x) is the probability vector assigned by CNN
to the input(x). Also, y ∗ and κ denote the real label of
the input and confidence parameter, respectively. Larger
value for confidence parameter leads the classifiers to assign the image to a new class different from the true one
with higher probability such that the difference between
the probability of the new class and others is κ at least.
Moreover, previous methods add perturbation directly
to images. Therefore, finding a perturbation that keeps
the final value of images in acceptable rage [0, 1] is difficult. To simplify the problem, they suggested using
the alternative term of 12 (tanh(z) + 1) whose value is always in [0, 1]. More precisely, the perturbation δ is added
to arc-tangent hyperbolic value of an image instead of
added directly images. As one can see in equation 4, the
user does not add the noise (δ) to her images directly.
The variable δ can get any values from [−∞, ∞].

B Overlay Images
We used different images of objects, landscape etc. in
our set S (initial set of overlay images). We did not
have any constraints on selecting the images except not
having human faces in there. Because using an image
with faces in there may reduce the recognizability of
the images by end users.
Set of overlay images used in our experiments are
shown in Figure 20.

C Neural Networks
We trained small convolutional neural networks on limited faces (10 classes of faces). To minimize the network
dependencies, we utilized two different CNNs structures
trained on different images sizes.
VGG16:
model = S e q u e n t i a l ( )
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input_shape=shape_image ) )
model . add ( LeakyReLU ( a l p h a = . 0 1 ) )
model . add ( MaxPooling2D ( p o o l _ s i z e = ( 2 , 2 ) ) )
model . add ( Conv2D ( 6 4 , ( 3 , 3 ) ) )
model . add ( LeakyReLU ( a l p h a = . 0 1 ) )
model . add ( MaxPooling2D ( p o o l _ s i z e =(2 , 2 ) ) )
model . add ( Dropout ( 0 . 5 ) )
model . add ( Conv2D ( 1 2 8 , ( 3 , 3 ) ) )
model . add ( LeakyReLU ( a l p h a = . 0 1 ) )
model . add ( MaxPooling2D ( p o o l _ s i z e =(2 , 2 ) ) )
model . add ( Dropout ( 0 . 5 ) )
model . add ( F l a t t e n ( ) )
model . add ( Dense ( 2 0 0 ) )
model . add ( LeakyReLU ( a l p h a = . 0 1 ) )
model . add ( Dropout ( 0 . 5 ) )
model . add ( Dense ( s e l f . num_classes ) )
Fig. 20. Set S of the overlay images used in generating k-RTIO
images

Original

Perturbed

Recovered

model . add ( Conv2D ( 1 2 8 , ( 5 , 5 ) ,
input_shape=shape_image ) )
model . add ( A c t i v a t i o n ( ’ r e l u ’ ) )
model . add ( MaxPooling2D ( p o o l _ s i z e = ( 2 , 2 ) ,
s t r i d e s = ( 2 , 2 ) , padding= ’ v a l i d ’ ) )
model . add ( Conv2D ( 2 5 6 , ( 3 , 3 ) ) )
model . add ( A c t i v a t i o n ( ’ r e l u ’ ) )
model . add ( MaxPooling2D ( p o o l _ s i z e =(2 , 2 ) ,
s t r i d e s = ( 2 , 2 ) , padding= ’ v a l i d ’ ) )
model . add ( Conv2D ( 5 1 2 , ( 3 , 3 ) ) )
model . add ( A c t i v a t i o n ( ’ r e l u ’ ) )
model . add ( MaxPooling2D ( p o o l _ s i z e =(2 , 2 ) ,
s t r i d e s = ( 2 , 2 ) , padding= ’ v a l i d ’ ) )
model . add ( Conv2D ( 5 1 2 , ( 2 , 2 ) ) )
model . add ( A c t i v a t i o n ( ’ r e l u ’ ) )
model . add ( MaxPooling2D ( p o o l _ s i z e =(2 , 2 ) ) )
model . add ( Conv2D ( 5 1 2 , ( 2 , 2 ) ) )
model . add ( A c t i v a t i o n ( ’ r e l u ’ ) )
model . add ( MaxPooling2D ( p o o l _ s i z e =(2 , 2 ) ,
s t r i d e s = ( 2 , 2 ) , padding= ’ v a l i d ’ ) )
model . add ( F l a t t e n ( ) )
model . add ( Dropout ( 0 . 5 ) )
model . add ( Dense ( 2 0 0 ) )
model . add ( A c t i v a t i o n ( ’ r e l u ’ ) )
model . add ( Dropout ( 0 . 5 ) )
model . add ( Dense ( s e l f . num_classes ) )
FaceScrub:
model = S e q u e n t i a l ( )
model . add ( Conv2D ( 3 2 , ( 3 , 3 ) ,

D Blind Signal Separation
Blind signal separation (BSS) is used to extract independent signals X = [xT1 , · · · , xTn ] which are mixed together by a mixing matrix (Am×n ) from the resulting
signals B = A × X. The solution would be easy if the
adversary knows the mixing matrix (Am×n ). However,
this matrix is unknown. The adversary can use blind
signal separation method to recover the original signal
only by considering the correlation between the signals
B.
Let, I = [I1 , · · · , Im ] be a set of original images where
we want to add the image I 0 as a new layer with the
weight of α (bj = αIj + (1 − α)Ij0 ). The user first converts the images to raw data in the form that a signal
is represented by as follows:




I11 . . . I1n
α 0 0 ... 1 − α
I

 21 . . . I2n 
 0 α 0 . . . 1 − α
 .

..
.. 
,A = 
.
X=
. .
..
.. 
.
. 
 .
 .. ..


.
. 
Im1 . . . Imn 
0 0 ... α 1 − α
0
0
I11
. . . I1n
(9)
and then creates matrix A. The user obtains the perturbed images by multiplying matrix X by A.
The adversary only has access to the mixed signal
B and wants to recover the original images.
As shown in Figure 21a, we used FastICA [12, 55]
method (variant of BSS for images) to recover the I 0
or the images. As shown in this Figure, the adversary
can easily recover the original images from the mixed
images. Because this method initializes the correlation
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matrix randomly, the final recovered images are different. But it is possible to recover one of the pictures well.
It is obvious that just by having one image, we can recover the other images easily. However, in k-RTIO we
apply different overlay images for each original image.
Further, we also select uniformly at random k overlay
images used for any given image from a larger pool of S
overlay images which makes finding blocks overlaid with
same k blocks difficult. Therefore, BSS is not effective
against k-RTIO.

Input2

Input2
Input3

Input1

Mixed1

Mixed3 Mixed2

Mixed2
Mixed3

Mixed1

Restored1

Restored2
Restored3

Restored3
Restored2

Restored1

Input1

(a) Naive TOT

Input3

(b) k-RTIO

Fig. 21. Blind Signal Separation can recover perturbed images
by transparent overlays technique. Generating overlay images
by permuting the original overlay images’ blocks randomly leads
BSS to not be able to recover images.
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